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LEAD

ARTICLE

Automobile leasing
Problems and solutions

The legal protection of consumers who lease
automobiles has improved recently. But the new
rules don't adequately address key problems.
By Daniel A. Edelman

The number of consumers who lease automobiles in
the United States has grown dramatically over the last
decade. While leasing offers some advantages to consumers, it also contains many pitfalls for the unwary. One of
the greatest potential dangers of leasing a car are the
charges that accrue when the lease is terminated before
its scheduled expiration date. This article outlines the
extent of the consumer protection problem in Part I. Part
1t describes current regulation of automobile leasing. Part
EEenumerates the special problems arising from early lease
termination. Part Iv focuses on the harmful effects of nondisclosure of lease terms. Part V advocates legislative
changes to solve auto leasing abuses.

Automobile leasing is a significant
consumer protection problem

early ternination charges.3 Although the rate of early termination has declined in recent years, a few years ago 50
to 80 percent of leases terminated early.4 Early termination may occur because the lessee defaults, because the
car is wrecked or stolen, or because the lessee wants to
trade the leased car in for a new car. Whatever the reason,
early termination often imposes severe penalties on the
lessee.
A 1989 report of an investigation by the Attorney General of New York found that many standard form leases
issued by major leasing companies imposed unconscionable penalties upon early termination and failed to disclose material information concerning early termination.Industry studies confirm that "[bletter than 80 percent"
of automobile lessees do not fully understand their contractual obligations.6 Industry representatives also acknowledge widespread consumer dissatisfaction with the
charges that lessees incur upon the early termination of
automobile leases. 7
In addition, the problem has become more serious because automobile leasing is no longer the exclusive province of the wealthy and professionals.' On the contrary,

Automobile leases present a serious consumer protection problem. More than 25 percent of new cars "sold" in
the United States at the present time are actually sold to a
leasing company, which in turn leases them to the user.'
In the case of some luxury car lines, including Mercedes
and Jaguar, more than 50 percent are
leased. 2
DanielA. EdeIman is a founding partnerofEdelman & Combs, a Chicago
Presently, the single largest consumer
law firm specializing in consumer protection litigation.He has published
protection problem in automobile leases
and spoken ei:tensively on consumer law issues. Mr.Edelman received his
is the size and incomprehensibility of
J.D. from the University of Chicago Law School in 1976.
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the lower monthly payments for leases are touted as a
means for persons who could not otherwise afford a new
car to acquire one.' Lessors compare the lease arrangement to "renting an apartment when you can't afford a
home."" Working people may not understand that while
the lease payments are "seductively low," a consumer who
tires of the car, or gets tired of paying for expensive repairs," and turns it in early, "can trigger penalties so hefty
that you would have done better to come up with a down
payment to buy."' 2
Even completed leases present a problem. If the lessee
turns the car in at the end of the lease, she is generally not
responsible for any difference between the car's value and
the leasing company's original projection. 3 Some leases,
however, contain inadequate or unrealistic statements of
the condition in which the car must be returned. If this is
so, the consumer may receive a substantial bill for "wear
and tear" or "excess mileage."
In addition, most "excess mileage" formulas are inappropriate, requiring the lessee to pay a fixed sum for each
extra mile the car is driven. This is unfair because once a
car is driven a certain number of miles, its value does not
further diminish according to used car blue and red books.
Nonetheless, many leasing provisions require the lessee
to pay for the alleged devaluation of the car.
Comparing the advantages of buying and leasing is
virtually impossible, which creates another major consumer protection problem. While the consumer can compare monthly payments, this comparison is meaningless
because the lessee does not ultimately acquire title to the
car. In addition, the information necessary to compare a
lease and an installment purchase-the "capitalized cost"
(equivalent of price) and the "rate of lease charge" (equivalent of rate of interest or finance charge)-is normally
not disclosed by the car dealer or leasing company. Present
federal law does not require disclosure of these items per
se. Because the law requires the early termination liability disclosure to be comprehensible to a layperson, the
dealer or leasing company may find it necessary as a practical matter to disclose this information if it is used in
4
computing early termination liability.
Because the capitalized cost is not disclosed, car dealers may try to use a capitalized cost equal to or exceeding
100 percent of the sticker price. Most people that buy
cars do not pay anything near 100 percent of the sticker
price. However, a surprising number of lessees do, with-
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Common lease phrases
This box contains definitions of some common
accounting terms used in leases.
-Residual value, or lease-end value, is the
car's estimated worth at the scheduled end of the
lease. The figure may be accurate, may be the
product of wishful thinking by the leasing
company, or may be affected by a subsidy and be
totally fictitious.
-Capitalizedcost is the equivalent of price in a
sale transaction. It equals the residual value plus
the car's expected depreciation during the lease's
term. It may also include sales tax payable by the
leasing company upon the car dealer's transfer of
title to it, as well as extended warranties.
*Leasecharge, the equivalent of interest or
finance charges on a loan, represents compensation for paying in installments rather than all at
once. Some recent leases provide that the lessee
will pay the entire charge up front in one lump
sum, and consequently do not have a lease
charge.
The lease charge can be expressed as a
decimal or as a percentage, which the lessor
almost never discloses to the lessee voluntarily.
The decimal or percentage is applied to the entire
capitalized cost, not just to the depreciation that
takes place during the term of the lease.
If a lease that includes a lease charge is ended
early, the lessor ordinarily must provide a credit
for the unearned portion. This is because where
an obligation payable over time is accelerated,
failure to give a credit for the "unearned interest"
or its equivalent (i.e., the portion of the payments
representing the time value of money) imposes a
penalty for early termination.
-Monthly payments. If the lease calls for
monthly payments, they consist of a depreciation
component and a lease charge component. If the
leasing of a vehicle is taxed, the taxes are
included as well.
-Capitalizedcost reduction is either the
equivalent of a down payment or trade-in, or a
reduction given by the manufacturer.
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out realizing it. The New York Attorney General's report
found this a significant problem:
The initial value of the car being leased (the
cost of acquisition to the lessor) is traditionally not disclosed to lessees. Many lessors
artificially inflate this value so that they can
increase the amount of depreciation, the major component of the lessee's monthly payments. The higher the initial value, the greater
the depreciation and the greater the monthly
payment and, consequently, at early terminaa
tion, the lessee will be responsible for
greater amount of depreciation.
For example, some lessors reportedly assign an amount equal to 110 percent of the
"Manufacturer's Suggested Retail Price"
(MSRP) for the initial value of the cars leased.
Even using MSRP for the initial value would
constitute an exaggeration, in most instances,
because cars are usually purchased for substantially less than the MSRP.15
Because car dealers often make much more money
leasing a car than selling it, the nondisclosure of the capitalized cost gives rise to a species of "bait and switch"
tactic. A consumer may visit a car dealership and negotiate a sale price with
payments of $x per
month. The car dealer
then suggests that if the
consumer leases rather
than buys, she can decrease the monthly payments by some substantial amount. The consumer perceives this as a good deal
and signs on the dotted line, but this is not necessarily
true. Because the consumer "buys" half a car or less under a lease, a dealer can use a capitalized cost equal to
100 percent or more of the sticker price and still make the
monthly payments come out lower than in the installment
purchase. The uninitiated consumer might think the dealer
has based the lease on the just-negotiated sales price, but
she has not. 6
Most leases present another consumer protection problem by including what is known as a "hell or high water"
clause. These clauses require the lessee to continue making monthly payments "come hell or high water;" in es-

sence, even if the leasec car is completely inoperable.
Since 1976, a Federal Trade Commission (Frc) regulation 17has effectively elimi nated this type of clause in transactions where a consume
inai er signs an installment contract
a
atis aiedt
ncial institution, or where a car
dealer arrin es aoa
y abolishing the "holder in due
irthestlan
gele
lation probably does not sactions.'I However, this reguFinally, some dealers f apply to leases.
trade-in vehicle. It has Fail to account for the consumer's
times induce consumers 'een alleged that dealers somelittle or no consideration. to surrender their vehicles for

Legal regulation o

f automobile leasing

While lessees are note
ntirely without legal protection,
the current regulatory sci
ieme often proves insufficient.
theral regulaton. A
utomobile leasing is regulated
Federal
on.uA
r Leasing Act or Truth in Leasby the Federal Consume1
76 as chapter 5 of the Truth in
Act,19Act.
enacted
in 19
ing
The statedr
Lending
purposes of the Truth in Leasing
Act are "to assure a mean
ingful disclosure of the terms of
leases of personal propert y for personal, family, or household purposes so as to em able the lessee to compare more
readily the various lease t erms available to him, limit balloon payments in consunrer leasing, enable comparison
of lease terms with credit
terms where appropriate,
and to assure meaningful
and accurate disclosures of
lease terms in advertisements."20
The Truth in Leasing Act
and Federal Reserve Board
Regulation 1I require ex tensive disclosures in consumer
lease transactions and regulate certain substantive terms
of such transactions. The Truth in Leasing Act and Regulation M apply to any "cor isumer lease," defined as a "contract in the form of a leas e or bailment for the use of personal property by a natu ral person for a period of time
exceeding four months, and for a total contractual obligation not exceeding $25, 000, primarily for personal, family, or household purpose s, whether or not the lessee has
the option to purchase or otherwise become the owner of
the property at the expira tion of the lease .... Leases for
r commercial purposes" are ex"agricultural, business, o:
cluded. 22

Early termination formulas
often contain unfair
provisions despite regulation.

16 - Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

Volume 7, number 1

The Truth in Leasing Act provides for substantive regulation of charges for early termination, delinquency and
default:
Penalties or other charges for delinquency,
default, or early termination may be specified in the lease but only at an amount which
is reasonable in light of the anticipated or
actual harm caused by the delinquency, default, or early termination, the difficulties of
proof of loss, and the inconvenience or
nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.23
In addition, the Truth in Leasing Act and Regulation
M require a lessor to provide a lessee with extensive disclosures analogous to those required in the case of credit
transactions by the Truth in Lending Act, prior to the consummation of a lease.24 The disclosures must be made
"clearly, conspicuously, [and] in meaningful sequence,"
either on a separate written statement or in the contract
above the place for the lessee's signature. 5 Also, they must
be "reasonably understandable" 26 and must be "made together on a single page (which may include both sides)
and above the place for the lessee's signature."" Conversely, required disclosures may not be in fine print on
the back of the page.
Moreover, sufficiency of disclosure is viewed from the
standpoint of an average consumer. 28 Whether a disclosure is reasonably understandable to a layperson is ordinarily a question of fact. 29 The usual means of proof are
the testimony of the consumer, surveys, focus groups, and
experts in linguistics and communications.3 °
Regulation M requires a lessor to disclose:
(1) "The amount or method of determining the amount
of any penalty or other charge for delinquency, default,
or late payments."'"
(2) "A statement of the conditions under which the
lessee or lessor may terminate the lease prior to the end
of the lease term and the amount or method of determining the amount of any penalty or other charge for early
32
termination."
(3) "A statement identifying any express warranties
or guarantees available to the lessee made by the lessor
or manufacturer with respect to the leased property."33
(4) "The total amount paid or payable by the lessee
during the lease term for official fees, registration, certifi34
cate of title, license fees, or taxes.
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(5) "[A] statement of reasonable standards for wear
and use .... 3 5
(6) When and for how
much the consumer can exer36
cise a purchase option.
Finally, the Truth in Leasing Act provides that any lessor who violates any requirement imposed under its disclosure and regulation of charges sections and the implementing regulations is liable as provided in the Truth in
Lending Act. However, the statute of limitations runs from
the end of the lease, rather than from the consummation
of a credit transaction.
State regulation.At the state level, automobile leases
are generally subject to state "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices" statutes, such as the Illinois Consumer Fraud
Act.37 The Federal Trade Commission has held that it is
an unfair and deceptive practice to systematically impose
penalties-i.e., amounts which do not constitute a legitimate liquidation of damages-through form contracts. 8
Additionally, termination charges in leases are subject
to examination under state common law, which will enforce reasonable provisions for liquidated damages but
not penalties.39 Also, Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, a new article dealing with leasing transactions,
also regulates termination charges in leases.

The problems with typical early
termination formulas in leases
Early termination formulas often contain inherently
unfair provisions despite regulation. Some older automobile leases required the lessee to make all the remaining
payments even though the lease was terminated and the
car returned early. This type of provision is almost certairly invalid under the Truth in Leasing Act provision
requiring that termination and default charges be reasonable.' These provisions are also likely invalid under state
common law refusing to enforce penalties as opposed to
liquidated damages.4 Analytically, such a provision is the
same as one that would require a borrower to pay all of
the interest on a loan even though the loan is repaid halfway through the term.4 2 In addition, such a formula would
43
also be invalid under Article 2A of the U.C.C.
More recent leases usually provide that upon early termination the lessee will receive some sort of credit for
the unearned "lease charge." This credit may be computed
according to the "actuarial" or "economic accrual"
method, also known as the "constant yield" method. How-
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ever, some leases still use one of the formulas that financial
institutions have devised to arbitrarily allocate artificial
amounts of interest to the beginning of an installment
obligation, such as the "Rule of 78s," also known as the
"sum--of-the-digits method."
Generally, the Rule of 78s unduly favors the lessor and
penalizes the consumer because it "front-loads" the interest, allocating a disproportionate amount to the earlier
months of the obligation. 4 In the absence of specific statutory or regulatory authorization to use it in connection
with a transaction, it should not be appropriate to use the
Rule of 78s to compute interest or other compensation
for the time value of money. 5 For example, in Kedziora
v. CiticorpNational Services, Inc.,16 the court held that a
complaint alleging use of the Rule of 78s to rebate unearned lease charge stated a cause of action under the Truth
in Leasing Act and Regulation M.
The early termination charges may still be unfair even
if the lease uses the actuarial method. As explained previously,47 under a closed end lease, the lessee is not responsible at the scheduled termination of the lease for any
shortfall between the residual value of the car and the
actual value of the car. On early termination, however,
the lessee is often required to pay any shortfall between
the residual value and the actual price the car brings at a
wholesale auto auction ("realized value"). Thus, if the
residual value is an overly optimistic estimate or a subsidized number, a very large penalty is built into the lease.
Even if it is accurate, the capitalized cost is a retail figure,
while an auto auction price is a low wholesale figure.
Therefore, the lessee is required to pay the difference between the wholesale and retail values of the car upon early
4
termination. 1
Finally, use of the residual value is inappropriate in
such a formula without adjustment to account for the fact
that the car is being returned earlier than projected. Rather,
the appropriate figure is that sum which, if presently invested, will produce the residual value at the time the car
was scheduled to be returned to the leasing company.49
The 1989 New York Attorney General's report elaborates:
Many lessors credit the lessee with the difference between the "realized value" (i.e., the
amount the lessor actually receives for the car
when the lessor sells it at the time of early
termination) and the "residual value" (i.e., the
amount pre-designated in the lease as the
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value of the car at the end of the lease term).
The residual value is what the lessor may
claim at the end of the lease-not at the earlier time of termination. The right to the residual value at the time of early termination
(before it is due), is worth less than the full
amount of the residual value. Therefore, the
credit to the lessee should be the difference
between the residual value and the present
worth of obtaining the residual value.
For example, assume a $15,000 car with a
residual value after four years of $6,000 and
a realized value, following early termination
after two years, of $9,000. The credit to the
lessor is not $3,000 ($9,000 - $6,000) because, at a given annual interest rate of 10
percent, the present value of eventually collecting $6,000 after two years is only $4,916
(or stated differently, $4,916 earning 10 percent annual interest, compounded monthly,
will yield $6,000 at the end of two years).
The proper credit to the lessee, therefore, is
$9,000 - $4,916 or $4,084.0
An additional problem results when some leases both
use the realized value of the vehicle upon early termination to determine the lessee's liability and assess excess
mileage charges against the lessee. This is unfair because
any greater-than-normal usage of the vehicle will be reflected in a lower-than-normal realized value. In effect,
the depreciating impact of the extra miles is counted twice.
An auto manufacturer that wants to move cars will
often do so by subsidizing leases in one of two ways. The
fair way is to reduce the price charged to the dealer, who
in turn reduces the capitalized cost. The unfair way is for
the manufacturer to guarantee the leasing company that
the car will have an unrealistically high residual value
when the lease ends, e.g., 80 percent of capitalized cost at
the end of a two-year lease. The effect of the residual
value guarantee is that if the lessee terminates early under a lease that holds the lessee responsible for the difference between the residual value and the realized value on
early termination, he must refund the subsidy. Of course,
the lessee has not been told that the subsidy exists or that
he has to refund the subsidy on early termination.
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Disclosure issues
Even if the termination formula is fair, it may still be
utterly incomprehensible to a non-accountant. Until 1993,
leasing companies tended to describe their termination
provisions using technical language, such as the "rules
for journal entries for Lessors as to the 'direct financing
leases' set forth in Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 13 (FASB 13) issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board."51 However, in Lundquist v.
Security Pacific Automotive FinancialServices Corp.52,
the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that a lease
using this language was incomprehensible to a layperson
and therefore failed to comply with Regulation M. Also,
other courts have held that leases that fail to disclose all
components used in the early termination calculation,53
and leases that require the lessee to perform computations to derive numbers which were known to the leasing
company when the lease was drawn up, violate Regula4
tion M.1
In contrast, the court in Kedziora, and a companion
case against General Motors Acceptance Corporation,55
held that a reference to the Rule of 78s was sufficient,
even though one suspects that most consumers would find
these terms as obscure as "FASB 13." However, the court
relied erroneously on a now-rescinded Federal Reserve
Board interpretation under the Truth in Lending Act that
required a creditor to refrain from explaining the Rule of
78s to avoid "informational overload. 51 6 Ultimately, this
conflict between decisions will have to be resolved on
the appellate level.
Actually, preparing a lease which explains the actuarial method in plain English is quite simple. All that is
necessary is disclosure of the capitalized cost and rate of
lease charge, and a statement that each monthly payment
will be applied first to the lease charge at x percent and
then to reduce the capitalized cost, just like mortgage payments are applied first to interest and then to principal.
Furthermore, once the capitalized cost and rate of lease
charge are determined, the lessor can simply hand an
amortization schedule to the lessee. However, the only
leases in which the author has seen any such disclosures
are in a form used by some credit unions, and leases issued in the state of Maryland, which require that the lessor give the lessee a partial amortization schedule.
The Federal Reserve Board is currently considering
revisions to Regulation M. The leasing companies re-
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sponded to the Lundquist decision by asking the Board to
overrule it and authorize such "disclosures" as the "rules
for journal entries for Lessors as to the 'direct financing
leases' set forth in Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 13 issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board." On the other hand, certain consumer groups,
including the National Consumer Law Center in Boston,
have asked the Board to require disclosure of the capitalized cost and rate of lease charge if they are elements of
an early termination formula.
Allowing the type of meaningless "disclosure" condemned in Lundquist would be contrary to the intended
purpose of the Truth in Leasing Act. The Senate Report
that accompanied the Truth in Leasing Act explained:
Testimony in the Subcommittee hearings indicated that a large number of auto leases were
terminated prior to their scheduled expiration.
Sometimes this was on account of the
customer's default, but more often the early
termination was at the customer's request in
order to enter into a new lease for different
goods. Whether the early termination is voluntary or involuntary from the customer's
point of view, the bill requires full disclosure
of any charges incident to such termination.
It also requires disclosures of any charges for
delinquency or default. 7
Another major disclosure problem concerns warranties. Many leases do not clearly apprise the lessee of what
warranty rights he has, if any. They either state that there
"may be" a warranty or inform the lessee that he has whatever rights the leasing company has under the
manufacturer's warranty that are assignable by the leasing company to the lessee.
In Highsmith v. Chrysler Credit Corp.," the Seventh
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that a disclosure that
there "may be" a warranty fails to comply with the Regulation M requirement of "[a] statement identifying any
express warranties or guarantees available to the lessee
made by the lessor or manufacturer with respect to the
leased property."5 9 In the author's view, "disclosures" requiring the lessee to make a legal judgment as to the
assignability of warranty rights are no better.' In particular, many manufacturer's warranties distinguish between
consumer and commercial purchasers of vehicles; for
example, they disclaim implied warranties to commer-
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cial purchasers but not consumer purchasers. The leasing company is a commercial purchaser: it acquires title
to the vehicle for the purpose of using it in its leasing
business. In this situation, the consumer purchaser may
not have any implied warranty rights.
Another disclosure problem is that car dealers and leasing companies are reluctant to disclose the capitalized cost
and rate of lease charge. At the present time, the Truth in
Leasing Act and Regulation M do not directly require disclosure of the capitalized cost and rate of lease charge per
se. However, in Maryland NationalBank v. Goodman,61
the court indicated in an opinion on a motion to dismiss
that if the capitalized cost exceeds 100 percent of the
sticker price, it may be an unfair or deceptive business
practice not to disclose the fact. In addition, the Illinois
Appellate Court has held that it is an unfair and deceptive
practice to sell a car at a price above the advertised sell62
ing price by failing to disclose the advertised price.
Therefore, if it is unfair and deceptive to sell a car to a
consumer above the advertised price, it should also be
unfair and deceptive to charge a consumer with an amount
of lease depreciation which assumes the car is worth more
than MSRP (which is itself substantially in excess of the
normal selling price), without disclosure of that fact to
the consumer at the time the lease is signed. In both cases,
the same material information about the value of the car
is being withheld from the consumer.
Finally, lease advertising presents a substantial problem. An examination of the auto section of a major newspaper reveals numerous advertisements which tout a
monthly payment for a car, without prominent disclosure
of whether it is a lease or installment purchase. This can
mislead consumers about the difference in cost between
buying and leasing.

Need for legislation
While recent decisions have improved the legal protection for automobile lessees, the numerous abuses in
the leasing area make legislative action desirable to insure uniform protection for the 25 percent of the population that leases cars. A few states have addressed some of
the abuses discussed in this article. One previous example
is Maryland, which requires that the lessee be provided
with a table of early termination values at various points
during the lease term.
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In addition, a number of reforms are made in a recent
New York statute,63 which contains provisions remedying many of the common abuses. Among its principal features are the following:
(1) Protection against unreasonable wear-and-tear
charges at end of lease through an arbitration mechanism.
(2) Disclosure and substantive regulation of early termination charges. The lessor must disclose an "initial early
termination charge," consisting of initial lease value plus
any additional early termination liability that would be
incurred by termination. There is also a reasonableness
restriction similar to federal law, but more specific, in that
it requires actuarial computation of the lease charge.
(3) Protection against confiscation of trade-ins. The
transaction is cancelable until the lease terms are finalized
by the leasing company. If the consumer does not like the
terms, she is entitled to get her car back.
Under this law, a lessor cannot provide that early termination will always be treated as a default. The lessee is
in effect given a right to terminate early, and there is no
default unless he fails to pay the termination liability upon
demand.
Furthermore, the New York law requires that an advance copy of the lease must be available at the dealership,
enabling the consumer to take it to his accountant for deciphering. The law also applies the Truth in Leasing disclosure requirements to leases in excess of $25,000. This
corrects the fact that the jurisdictional limit in the federal
statute has not been increased since 1976, when the price
of most passenger cars was less than $25,000. In addition, the statute makes the lessor subject to defenses, so
that the lessee of a lemon automobile can refuse payment.
However, the single most serious shortfall in the New York
statute is that it does not require disclosure of the capitalized cost per se, or the equivalent of an annual percentage rate.
The author urges other states to enact statutes similar
to the New York law, with the added requirements that
the capitalized cost and rate of lease charge be disclosed,
and that advertising disclose that a transaction is a lease
in type equal in size to that used for the monthly payments. Such legislation, with effective provision for both
private and governmental enforcement, would go a long
way to assure fair treatment for automobile lessees and
allow prospective lessees to determine if leasing is really
right for them.
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Calif. insurance limits
A recent California court ruling upholding strict
limits on insurance rates drew both criticism from
insurance industry groups and praise from consumer
groups. The decision requires California auto and home
insurers to refund $1 billion to customers who were
overcharged. In addition, it allows the state to set rate
controls.
Insurance groups worry about the effects of the
ruling on the nation's biggest state and predict other
states will be affected as well. "This will likely cause
other state regulators to determine whether they can
also be successful in trying to get rebates or cap
profits," observed Steve Goldstein, a spokesman for the
Insurance Information Institute, a research group
representing 250 companies.
"It's outstanding," said Kathleen F. O'Reilly,
president and general counsel of a consumer rights
group, the National Insurance Consumer Organization.
"It has wide implications for other states that have been
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sitting on the sidelines waiting to see if they could do

anything like this."
J. Robert Hunter, insurance commissioner in Texas
and co-author of the California initiative, predicts many
states will adopt similar laws. "Now there's precedent,"
Hunter said.

Who's listening?
The Illinois Bar Association warns attorneys that
cellular phone conversations are easily intercepted and
may pose a risk to attorney-client confidentiality. In
addition, lawyers should warn clients of the risks and
get their consent before discussing privileged legal
matters over cellular phones.
Although listening in on cellular calls is a federal
crime, attorney and longtime cellular phone user F. Lee
Bailey warns, "Number one: You just have to remember
that no one has the right to listen in on an attorneyclient privileged conversation. And number two: They
probably do."
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